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As of January 03, 2026, President Donald Trump has claimed the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and announced that the United States will be “very strongly involved” in Venezuela’s oil industry, signaling a major shift in U.S. policy toward direct involvement in the country’s energy sector.123 This move is expected to provide significant financial and strategic benefits to the U.S. government and American energy companies by granting access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves—the largest in the world—and reshaping regional energy flows to favor U.S. interests.

• The U.S. aims to redirect Venezuela’s oil exports from opaque, state-to-state deals with China—conducted via “dark fleets”—to transparent, market-rate sales in the West, which could increase U.S. influence over global oil pricing and reduce Beijing’s access to discounted crude.45
• A pro-U.S. government in Caracas would likely reverse nationalization policies, allowing American firms to re-enter the Venezuelan market under new bilateral investment treaties that ensure investor protections, potentially unlocking up to $1.7 trillion in wealth for U.S. companies over the next 15 years.59
• U.S. refiners, particularly on the Gulf Coast, are engineered to process heavy, sour crude oil—Venezuela’s primary export—making its revival critical to addressing a looming supply crunch caused by declining heavy oil imports from Mexico and overreliance on Canadian sources.4
• The reconstruction of Venezuela’s deteriorated oil infrastructure—estimated to require tens of billions in investment—would create a multi-year boom for U.S. energy service firms and supermajors, leveraging American capital and technology to rehabilitate the Orinoco Belt’s upgraders and production facilities.4
• A revived U.S.-aligned Venezuela could enable a “closed-loop” trade: U.S. shale producers would export naphtha (a light hydrocarbon byproduct) to Venezuela to dilute its extra-heavy crude, which would then be shipped back to U.S. refineries, creating a symbiotic relationship that supports both domestic shale and refining sectors.4
• Despite these opportunities, U.S. oil companies have previously declined to return to Venezuela due to political and financial risks, with only Chevron currently operating under a U.S. Treasury license, exporting limited volumes to the U.S..36

However, as of late December 2025, reports indicated that while there is latent interest among oil firms, actual corporate engagement remains cautious due to the high political risk and uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy intentions.9 The full financial benefits to the U.S. government will depend on the stability of a post-Maduro regime, the legal framework for resource extraction, and the ability to attract private investment into one of the world’s most sanction-affected energy markets.

What specific oil infrastructure in Venezuela would the U.S. rebuild?

The U.S. would primarily focus on rebuilding crude oil upgraders in the Orinoco Belt, which are essential for processing Venezuela’s extra-heavy crude into transportable and refinable oil. These upgraders, along with associated infrastructure like pipelines and diluent supply systems, were developed in the 1990s with foreign investment but have since deteriorated due to years of mismanagement and underinvestment by PDVSA.

Rehabilitating these upgraders is critical because Venezuela’s Orinoco crude is too heavy to flow naturally or be transported without upgrading or dilution. The U.S. energy sector, particularly Gulf Coast refiners, is well-equipped to support this effort using advanced technology and capital, enabling a closed-loop system where U.S.-supplied diluents (like naphtha) help move the heavy crude, which is then exported back to American refineries.